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1. Introduction 
 
There are long, (and often variable), lags between a change in interest rates and its 
effect on real output and inflation. Hence policy should be based on forecasts, 
(King 2000). So the eventual out-turn, e.g. for output and inflation, is a complex 
combination of the skills of the forecaster, the response of the policy-makers to 
those forecasts (and to their other, possibly private, sources of information), and 
the impact of shocks, some of which will have been unforeseen at the time of the 
forecast. The aim of this paper is to make a start at disentangling this mixture in 
the particular case of the Bank of England, and thereby to seek to assess the skills 
of the forecasters, the adequacy of the response of the monetary authorities, and 
the time path of disturbances to the auto-regressive structure of the economy. 
 
For most countries this exercise is, alas, impossible. Official forecasts are not 
published in many, perhaps most, cases. In other cases, where forecasts are 
                                                 
1   My thanks are due to O. Aspachs for excellent research assistance and to C. Bean, L. Benati, B. 
Friedman, P. Tulip and G. Wood for helpful comments and suggestions. 
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published, they are described as `staff forecasts’, and there is a careful distinction 
drawn between such `staff forecasts’ and the beliefs about the future of the policy-
makers themselves, e.g. in the ECB or FOMC. Fortunately these problems do not 
exist in the UK, at least not to the same extent. The forecasts for output and 
inflation are not only published, but, even though the more mechanical work in 
their production is done by the staff, the forecast is officially that of the Monetary 
Policy Committee itself.2  
 
In any attempt to describe the characteristics of forecasts, there are a number of 
issues that need to be reviewed; these include whether the subsequent outcome 
data are kept constant, or are subject to revision; whether the forecasts are ex ante, 
i.e. made before the associated policy decision, or ex post, i.e. incorporating that 
policy decision; the number of forecast moments to be considered; and the nature, 
transparency and plausibility of the conditioning assumptions about future 
policies in the forecast. This list is not necessarily exhaustive, but represents a 
start. 
 
One of the main problems in assessing the characteristics of the MPC’s forecasts 
is that the actual data for output growth are subject to continuous revision for 
many years.3 Indeed, in July 2005 the Chancellor, Gordon Brown, made an 
important revision to his fiscal platform, largely on the basis of changes in the 
 
2   Of course some of the nine members may have individual reservations and qualifications, some 
of which are at times reported in the Inflation Report, (notably in Table 6B in previous issues of 
this Report). 
3   See Statistics Commission (2004), Revisions to Economic Statistics, Vols 1, 2 and 3. 
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dating of a business cycle which, in turn, depended on revisions to the path of 
output in 1997-1999! This raises the question of what generation of ex post output 
estimate should be compared with any particular forecast. Say that the forecast for 
the level of output in year XX Q2 was 100, but the estimate of the output for year 
XX Q2 made in year XX Q3 was 99, made in year XX+1, Q1 was 100 and made 
in year XX+10 was 101, should one treat the forecast error as 1, 0 or -1? 
 
This problem is aggravated when the variable of chief interest is the output gap, 
since the latter depends on an estimate of the natural rate of output which is also 
subject to mismeasurement, sometimes as in the USA in the early 1970s and late 
1990s by quite a large margin. 
 
These problems are somewhat lessened in the UK by two factors. First the data 
published by the Bank of England for output relate to its growth rate, over the 
same quarter in the previous year. As Orphanides and Williams (2004, p. 6) note, 
mismeasurement of the natural rate (of unemployment or output) can be mitigated 
by replacing the data for the gaps by data for the growth of output/unemployment, 
and they further cite in support of using output growth data, (footnote 6), 
McCallum (1999), Orphanides (2003), Orphanides et al. (2000), and Walsh 
(2003). 
 
Second, fortunately for macro-economic research workers in the UK, the Bank 
has now provided spread sheet (Excel) data on real output values for each 
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generation of estimates from 1961 to 2001 Q3, (see Bank of England Quarterly 
Bulletin, Spring 2001, p. 42, `Building a real-time database for GDP(E)’ by Castle 
and Ellis, and its website, www.bankofengland.co.uk/statistics/gdpdatabase). This 
allows the research worker to choose which generation of estimate to use, but 
does not resolve the question of what actually is the best choice. This choice, in 
some large part, relates to the question of what the forecaster is trying to forecast; 
is she trying to forecast the first `flash’ estimate, which is known to be estimated 
with a large and erratic error, containing both much noise and bias; or the likely 
estimate after about one year; or the likely eventual estimate after some 5/10 
years. In practice, early estimates have consistently tended to be revised upwards 
over time, but the scale of bias is unknown, and the Office for National Statistics 
has been trying to reduce the scale of the bias. 
 
In contrast, the out-turn data for RPI(X), the retail price index excluding interest-
related elements, e.g. mortgage payments, have not been subject to any such 
revisions; the first reported outcome figure remains unchanged. The target for 
inflation, for the MPC to hit, was set at 2.5% from May 1997 (and was implicitly 
at that same level from 1993 till 1997), until the index for inflation targetry was 
changed from RPI(X) to the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices in November 
2004, and the target rebased as 2.0%.4 While there is some debate about which is 
the best index to use as a measure of inflation, e.g. how and whether to include 
housing costs, at least the time series itself is not continuously subject to change. 
 
4   That change primarily reflected the differing characteristics of the two indices, rather than any 
tightening of policy. 
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Whereas in other of my exercises making use of MPC forecasts, it has been 
necessary to make a stand on what generation of output outcome data to use, for 
the purpose of this exercise, I shall focus here primarily on the time series for the 
forecast and out-turn inflation where these problems do not arise. I shall only 
make secondary use of the output data series, and mostly for illustrative purposes. 
 
In one such prior exercise, (Goodhart 2005a), I have sought to demonstrate that 
the MPC reacted strongly to deviations of forecast inflation from its target level 
some 7 or 8 quarters hence (the main policy horizon) in the ex ante forecasts that 
they were shown. These forecasts were then conditioned on an assumption that 
the short-term policy rate remained unchanged throughout the forecast period at 
the level in effect at the start of the forecasting exercise. My results suggest that 
the reaction was strong enough to drive inflation back to target at the policy 
horizon in the ex post forecasts which the MPC publishes in the Inflation Report. 
These are ex post in the sense that they take account of, are based on, the policy 
decisions taken at this latest meeting; that is that the short-term policy rate 
remains constant throughout the forecast horizon at the level set at this latest 
meeting. My findings suggested that if a researcher used ex post, rather than ex 
ante, forecast data to estimate reaction functions, then the estimated reaction 
functions, especially those relating to the longer-dated forecasts, could be severely 
biased. 
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There are, however, well-known problems with the constant interest rate 
assumption, (see Goodhart 2005a and b, and the references therein), and this has 
now been replaced, as conditioning assumption, by the use of the time path for 
short-term interest rates implicit in the money market yield. So long, however, as 
the conditioning assumption is made transparent, so that it is publicly observable, 
and kept unchanged throughout the forecasting process, then the combination of 
an ex ante forecast and the record of policy decisions should enable a researcher 
to explore an MPC’s reaction function more accurately. 
 
One of the problems with assessing the central bank’s reaction function in both 
Canada and the USA is that the conditioning assumption about the future path of 
policy rates is not revealed, for example in the case of the U.S. Green Book 
forecasts, even after their five year embargo period. It is generally believed, (see 
Boivin, 2004; and Reifschneider, Stockton and Wilcox, 1997), that the Green 
Book forecasts are based on a constant interest rate assumption, except when there 
is good reason for the forecasters to assume a non-constant path, as in 2004/2005. 
But, if the researcher does not know what is the underlying interest rate 
conditioning assumption, how can she calibrate the reaction function by 
comparing the policy decision with the Green Book forecast? Indeed I do not 
know of any attempts to try to do so. Assume, for example, that the Green Book 
forecast showed stable inflation and output growth, but that the FOMC 
nevertheless raised interest rates. Was this because such a rising path of policy 
rates already formed the basis of the Green Book forecast, or because the FOMC 
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wanted to tighten more than indicated by a forecast based on a constant interest 
rate assumption, or what? 
 
In my earlier work (2005a) I sought to make use of this distinction between ex 
ante and ex post forecasts. I shall try to build on that further in this paper. 
 
Finally, the Inflation Forecasts published by the MPC include estimates of the 
three first moments of the forecast, the mean, variance and skew. The Inflation 
Report itself, intentionally, does not publish point figures; instead it gives a 
probability distribution, which in the case of the inflation forecast is colloquially 
named `Rivers of Blood’ from its regular red colour and river-delta shape. Of 
course, the associated central tendencies, the mode, median and mean exist, and 
after a short delay (whose objective is to focus attention on the distribution, not on 
the point forecast(s)), these are made publicly available by the Bank on its website 
(www.bankofengland.co.uk).  Initially, before 1995 Q1, the distribution was 
assumed to be symmetrical, so all three central tendencies were identical. 
Thereafter, a measure of skew, (as well as of uncertainty), is reported, together 
with separate figures for the mean, median and mode. For this exercise we use the 
modal forecasts throughout. In practice, see Goodhart (2004), the skews in the 
forecast have been small, so there would not, we believe, be much difference if we 
used the mean or median instead.  
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In the absence of (much) skew, a certainty equivalence condition holds, in that 
the MPC makes its decision on the basis of the central tendency without regard to 
the estimated variance of the probability distribution. That said, Clements (2004) 
and Wallis (1999, 2003, 2004) have claimed that the MPC erred by presenting 
density forecasts that were much more widely distributed than consistent with the 
tight range of actual outcomes. We will not pursue issues relating to such higher 
moments here, but just consider the forecasting record of the MPC’s modal 
forecasts, for inflation and to a lesser extent for output growth. 
 
With these preliminaries concluded, the structure of the paper is as follows. In the 
next Section, (Section 2), we ask how the characteristics of a forecast should be 
judged, conditional on the forecaster not being able to influence the variable being 
forecast. Then in Section 3, we review how the analysis and measurement in the 
previous Section needs to be amended when a major purpose of the forecast is 
exactly to allow steps to be taken that will drive the variables being forecast in a 
desired direction. When such steps are then taken, there will, as a result, be a 
distinction between an ex ante, and an ex post, forecast, a distinction which is 
meaningless in a Section 2 context. 
 
Then in Section 4 we consider the lag and auto-correlation structure of a 
simplified version of the economic system, including importantly that of the 
shocks themselves. We use this analysis to assess the likely auto-correlation of 
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forecast errors, and of the relationship between shocks and off-setting policy 
measures. Section 5 concludes, and outlines a programme of future research work. 
 
2. Forecasts when the outcome cannot be modified 
 
Most of the forecasts that people consult are of the above form, i.e. that the 
forecast itself has no effect on the subsequent outcome. This is true of the weather 
forecast, (subject to minor qualifications about ‘seeding’ clouds to encourage 
rain), and to forecasts about other geo-physical phenomena, (earthquakes, etc.) – 
though again there need to be qualifications about forecasts for global warming, in 
so far as the forecast may (be intended to) influence policy on greenhouse gasses. 
Many of the components of economic forecasts, for example of growth, inflation 
and interest rates abroad, or of oil prices, are similar; that is there is no 
expectation, or intention, that policy measures could be taken, as a result of the 
forecast itself, that would bring about changes to the variables being forecast, 
(though once again, there may be some minor qualifications). 
 
When we seek to assess the quality of forecasts, we generally have this genre of 
forecast in mind. What characteristics are we looking for?  Two such 
characteristics are commonly cited and measured by the forecasters themselves, 
which are accuracy, for example as measured by the Mean Average Error (MAE) 
or Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE), and bias, i.e. the average deviation of out-
turn from forecast (and the significance of such bias). These characteristics are, 
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however, on this view, less important to most users of such forecasts than the 
ability to predict the fluctuations around the mean outcome, which we can term 
the R2 characteristic. 
 
In Diagram 1, for example, we draw a chart of maximum temperatures on 30 
consecutive days, (the actual numbers have been made up). The average is 62.5. If 
a forecaster should just present a forecast for each, and every day, that the average 
maximum temperature will be 62.5 degrees that is some help,5 but does not tell us 
what we usually want to know, which is will today/tomorrow be hotter/colder 
than average. Thus a forecaster who could just estimate average out-turns might 
be reasonably accurate and unbiased, but relatively useless for most purposes. 
Indeed, a forecaster who was consistently wrong by, say, five degrees (quite a 
large amount) in one direction, (estimating the average at 57.5), but was exactly 
correct in assessing the fluctuations around (deviations from) the average would, 
for most purposes, be more use than a forecaster who constantly repeated the 
(correctly estimated) average. At least a user would know which days would be 
relatively hot or cold, and could dress accordingly. I do not know how one might 
trade off these various characteristics, i.e. average error, bias and R2, but my own 
preferences would be to give considerable weight to the latter. 
                                                 
5   Holiday guides, for example, frequently give details of expected mean monthly temperatures, or 
rainfall, in a resort, and that is useful information. 
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As will be obvious from the diagram, I have incorporated an auto-correlative 
structure into my temperature time series. This is often the case in forecasts of 
physical phenomena. Hot days come in heat-waves; earthquakes are followed by 
aftershocks. So a common, basic approach is to make use of such an auto-
regressive structure in the basic variable, often an AR1 structure; and thereby 
forecast that tomorrow will be much the same as today. A reasonable test of the 
forecast is whether it can improve on a mechanical auto-regressive prediction. Of 
course, how tough this test is depends on the richness of the auto-regressive 
structure employed as the comparator. The simplest test would be to compare the 
forecast just to a mechanical prediction based on the auto-regressive structure of 
the variable under consideration. 
 
This exact test has been conducted by Campbell (2004) for the USA for forecasts 
of real output. Taking a break-point in 1984 Q111, which he dates as the start of 
the ‘Great Moderation’, he finds, pp 9/10, that, 
 12
                                                
“Over the period 1969-2003, the R2 of the quarterly SPF [Survey of 
Professional Forecasters] forecasts is 22.3 percent as compared to only 6.5 
percent for the AR(1) forecasts.6 While these estimates suggest that the 
SPF forecasts are considerably more accurate than those generated from 
the AR(1), examining the one-step ahead R2 pre- and post-moderation 
reveals that the considerable advantage of the SPF over the AR(1) 
forecasts quickly deteriorated after 1984. Prior to 1984:3, the SPF forecast 
exhibited an R2 of 29.95 percent with observed real output growth as 
compared to only 7.4 percent for the AR(1) model. After the onset of the 
Great Moderation, the R2 of the AR(1) model falls slightly to 4.7 percent 
but the predictive accuracy of the SPF is completely eliminated. The 
sample estimate of the R2 between observed and forecasted growth is -4.26 
percent, indicating that professional forecasters’ ability to predict future 
growth is dominated by the (ex post) mean growth rate.7  
 
The results are similar when comparing the R2 of annual real output 
forecasts. The sample R2 of SPF annual real output forecasts is 21.7 
percent as compared to 0.7 percent for the AR(1) model over the entire 
sample period. Before the large decline in macroeconomic volatility, SPF 
forecasts were considerably more accurate than the AR(1) model. The R2 
between the actual and forecasted growth rates is 28.28 percent in the case 
of the SPF forecasts as compared with a point estimate of -4.1 percent in 
the case of the AR(1). After 1984:3, the roles of the SPF and AR(1) 
forecasts are reversed with the SPF forecasts exhibiting a negative point 
estimate of -16.53 percent and the predictive accuracy of the AR(1) model 
rising to 6.4 percent. The evidence from both these annual forecasts and 
the quarterly forecasts indicate that apart from a decline in volatility, the 
Great Moderation also ushered in a period of reduced forecastability.” 
 
Of course, the comparative test can be made tougher yet by using a broader VAR 
in place of a single variable autoregression. While I do have outline plans to do 
some collaborative research along such lines in future, for the purpose of this 
exercise, partly because of the short length of the data set being used, all that will 
be done is to examine how good, or bad, the MPC’s forecasts were, using the R2 
 
6   At this point it is worth noting that use of the full-sample estimates in constructing the AR(1) 
forecast residuals maximizes the in-sample R2 . Hence, the population R2 of the AR(1) model is 
certainly lower than 6.5 percent. 
7   Recall that the point estimate of R2 is not constrained to lie in the unit interval since the forecast 
errors are not constrained to have a sample mean of zero over either subsample, or even over the 
entire sample in the case of the SPF forecasts. 
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criteria. The data series used here go up to 2003 Q3, since the initial research 
was done in 2004. Any subsequent revision will extend the data set as far as 
possible. 
 
Forecasts for future inflation (RPIX) have been made in the Inflation Report by 
the Bank since 1993 Q1. Initially they were for the current quarter (t = 0), 
(remember that the forecast is completed in the middle month of each quarter), 
and the next six, or seven, quarters (t = 6, t = 7). Then in 1995 Q3, the forecast 
horizon was extended to, and has remained as, eight quarters (t = 8). As already 
stated, the actual data, for the RPI(X) series, taken from standard ONS series, 
once published are not revised. These data are shown in Table 1 below. The 
forecasts relating to each consecutive out-turn date are shown horizontally. Thus 
the forecast at t = 8 for 2003 Q3 (2.45) was made in 2001 Q3, at t = 7 (2.23) in 
2001 Q4, and for t = 0 (2.85) in August 2003, and compares with the out-turn of 
2.80. 
 
Although the Bank, obviously, made forecasts of the associated predicted (growth 
rates of) real GDP, it did not publish them in its Inflation Report until it was 
granted operational independence in May 1997; so the first published forecasts, 
(for the distribution of the growth of real GDP in the Inflation Report), date from 
1997 Q3. Although it may be possible at some future date for researchers to get 
hold of (so far) unpublished details of the Bank’s internal forecasts for earlier 
years, in this case I have preferred to work with the existing published forecast 
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data, despite the resulting short time series. These forecasts are shown in Table 
2 in exactly the same format as for inflation, except that we also show the series 
for both the contemporaneous [in practice the estimate made one year later], and 
also the latest available (as of 2004) output data. We shall focus on the 
relationship between the ‘contemporaneous’ and the forecast output series, since 
that, I believe, is what the forecasters are trying to predict. 
 
By the standard criteria, i.e. accuracy as measured by the Mean Average Error 
(MAE) or Root Mean Squared Error, and bias, i.e. the average error, the results 
are good, whether using the constant, or market rate, conditioning interest rate 
assumption. These are shown in Table 3. 
 
But when we turn to examine the R2 criteria the results change from good to bad. 
These are shown in Tables 4 for RPI(X) and 5 for changes in output. The R2 
values for the RPI regressions are below 0.2 at longer horizons until the forecast 
made at t = 1, and the b coefficient below 0.5 until t = 0. Similarly the Bank’s 
forecast for output growth has an R2 and b values of virtually zero until t = 1.  
 
To put it bluntly, the Bank does not appear to be able to provide any predictive 
guide at all to the fluctuations of output growth, or inflation, around its trend over 
a year in advance; it is only really in the last couple of quarters before the outturn 
that the forecasts have any predictive value for fluctuations around the trend.  
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But how should we interpret such apparent predictive `failure’?  Does it imply 
that the forecasts are just `no good’ until near the outcome date; and hence that 
such forecasts should be abandoned, thereby saving resources?  If the forecasts 
were forecasts for the weather, i.e. a variable whose outcome cannot be affected 
by the forecasters’ own action, the above condemnation would stand. Forecasts at 
horizons greater than t = 4 would be a waste of time; it would be just as good to 
assume that the average weather pattern will prevail. This, however, is not the 
case for forecasts of output growth and inflation. 
 
It is interesting (to me at least!) that exactly the same phenomenon appears to hold 
in the USA, since about 1984. As already noted, Campbell (2004) finds that the 
ability of professional forecasters to predict fluctuations in output since 1984 Q3 
has collapsed to zero. Tulip (2005) has examined the ability of the Fed staff (in 
the Green Book) to predict changes in output from 1968 (four quarter forecasts) 
and 1980 (eight quarter forecasts) up till 2001, (more recent years cannot be used 
because of the five year embargo). His conclusions, pp 11 and 12, are:- 
“There are four key points evident in [the previous] charts… 
1. As the literature on the Great Moderation has documented, the 
variance of output growth declines substantially, in the sense that it 
has been much smaller in the last two decades than it was in the 
previous two decades. 
2. In contrast, unpredictability does not show a clear trend. Although 
mean squared prediction errors of short-horizon forecasts tend to 
be larger before the early 1980s than after, the change is not large, 
obvious, or uniform. Moreover, the eight-quarter forecast errors 
seem to trend up, albeit over a shorter sample period. 
3. The predictable component of output growth has virtually 
disappeared. Although output was highly variable in the 1970s and 
early 1980s, most of this variation was predicted. In contrast, since 
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the late 1980s the Fed staff seems to have been unable to predict 
variations in output growth. 
4. Indeed, recent Mean Squared Errors have been larger than 
variances, particularly at longer horizons.” 
 
Finally Scott Schuh (2001) found that forecasters were unable to predict 
fluctuations in output and inflation at all well in recent years. He concluded, pp 
54/55, that:- 
“GDP and unemployment rate forecasts and, to a lesser extent, inflation 
forecasts veered off track in the second half of the 1990s. Although the 
errors are not unusually large in historical perspective, they are 
economically significant and troubling – particularly from the perspective 
of monetary policymakers who require accurate forecasts to set interest 
rates appropriately. On average, macroeconomic forecasts are 
approximately unbiased, but they are inefficient and the forecast errors are 
characterized by improper correlation. These factors indicate that 
macroeconomic forecasts leave considerable room for improvement 
 
At least with regard to the period 1996 to 2000, no individual forecasters 
in the SPF or WSJ predicted macroeconomic conditions accurately and 
consistently. However, the brief and preliminary investigation of 
individual forecaster performance in this study provides evidence of 
differential abilities among forecasters. Much more data and anlaysis are 
required in this area before any firm conclusions can be drawn about the 
best forecasters.” 
 
What these American authors note is that the large reduction in the overall 
volatility of the US economy, e.g. in output and inflation, has been due to the 
virtual disappearance of the predictable component of such fluctuations. Estimates 
of the unpredictable residual show no such diminution; indeed that appeared to 
increase in the latter half of the 1980s. My findings, above, are consistent with 
that having been the case in the UK also. Similarly Benati [2004] has found that 
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(the predictable) persistence of output and inflation was high in the 1970s in the 
UK, but declined to historically low levels in the 1990s and early 2000s. 
 
To some extent agents can protect themselves from predictable fluctuations in 
their surrounding circumstances. Since the moderation in volatility in Anglo-
Saxon countries has been the result of a decline in the forecasted component of 
such volatility, without any apparent accompanying reduction in forecast error, 
the decrease in economic uncertainty has been in practice much less than one 
might have expected from the greater stability of recent years. 
 
The common implication that most commentators would draw from this, and that 
the US writers cited above appear to make, is that the forecasters are falling down 
on their job. That would indeed be so if the outcomes were independent of the 
forecast itself, as with the weather. This, however, is not the case for MPC 
forecasts of output growth and inflation. 
 
3. The characteristics of a forecast intended to influence policy and outcomes 
 
The essential purpose of such a forecast is to inform policy-makers on how to 
vary their instruments, short-term interest rates in the case of the MPC, so as to 
drive the output gap and the deviation of inflation from target down to zero. The 
purpose of forecasting, certainly at the Bank and also, though perhaps to a lesser 
degree, among private sector forecasters, is to inform policy so as to drive output 
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growth (or gap) and inflation back to its (desired) trend level. If this is done 
perfectly, then the value of R2 at the forecast date should be zero, not unity!  If the 
resultant policy change is overdone, the b values would be negative. The less that 
the forecast (correctly) induces a policy response, the closer will the expected 
values of R2 and b return to unity. If there is no policy response at all to the 
forecast, we are back effectively to our weather forecasting simile. All this is 
perfectly well known in theory and in principle, (e.g. Tobin 1970; Blinder and 
Goldfeld 1972; Buiter 1984; Woodford 19948). It is quite rare, however, to see a 
documented, empirical example in practice. 
 
Why then do we see the forecasts increasingly exhibiting an ability to predict 
fluctuations around the trend as the horizon shortens?  The answer, of course, is 
that lags, (which are themselves subject to uncertainty), in the transmission 
                                                 
8   Woodford (1994, p. 101) writes:- 
“The point can be illustrated by the following extremely stylized model. Suppose that 
inflation over the relevant horizon is determined by a relation of the form 
 
(1) πt+1 = st + ut + εt+1 
 
where π, is inflation between dates t and t + 1, st is an indicator observed at date t, u, is a 
control variable of the monetary authority chosen at date t, and εt+1 is a mean-zero random 
variable not forecastable at date t. Equation (1) is intended to represent a causal effect of 
ut on the probability distribution of possible values for πt+1 which is understood by the 
monetary authority; for simplicity, this effect is assumed to be a simple shift in the 
conditional mean, and the size of the effect is assumed to be independent of the value of st 
that is observed. The appearance of st on the right-hand side of (1) need not have a causal 
interpretation; st may simply be correlated with factors that influence inflation 
independently of the control variable. The realizations of st and εt+1 are assumed to be 
independent of the choice of ut, and the realization of εt+1 likewise independent of st. 
 
It follows that the variance of πt+1 is minimized by a policy feedback rule of the form ut = 
-st. If such a rule is followed, πt+1 = εt+1, and a regression of πt+1 on st will yield 
(asymptotically) a zero coefficient. But it would be incorrect in such a case to tell the 
monetary authority to stop monitoring the value of st before choosing the value of ut.” 
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mechanism make it impossible, and/or undesirable (for a variety of reasons 
which we will not restate here) to use interest rate policy to offset short-term 
shocks. If interest rates could be effectively used contemporaneously and 
instantaneously to affect output and inflation, (as is assumed in many models), 
then the R2 of forecasts should be zero at all horizons, including t = 0. 
 
The question of what one might expect for the b coefficient is more complicated.9  
Suppose that y(t) = a + bx(t) + e(t), where x is the (unconditional) forecast, y the 
outturn, and e an unobserved shock, so that a = 0 and b = 1 (ie these are unbiased 
forecasts). Now assume that policy is set in order to ensure x(t) = y*. Then indeed 
y(t) = y* + e(t), which might lead one to expect that a = y* and b = 0. However, 
notice that y(t) = a + bx(t) + e(t) with a = 0 and b = 1 should fit the data just about 
as well, as indeed does any linear combination of the two regressions. The point is 
that x(t) and the constant become almost perfectly collinear, so when b rises (falls) 
the coefficient a declines (rises), and the standard errors on the coefficients 
increase. This is almost exactly what we find in our earlier regressions. 
 
One basic message is that the shorter (longer) the lag before the instrument affects 
the objective variable, the shorter (longer) is the horizon over which deviations 
from trend should become reasonably predictable. 
 
                                                 
9   I am indebted to C. Bean for this analysis. 
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The normal empirical finding is that the lag before interest rates affect output is 
shorter than that for inflation. So, what we should see is that longer horizon 
forecasts for inflation are rather better, by our criteria of R2 and b coefficient 
closer to unity, than for output growth. Whilst the differences between the 
forecasting characteristics (for inflation and output growth) are not strong, they do 
tend in the direction hypothesized. With the Bank forecasts, all the coefficients for 
inflation, out to t = 8, are positive, and most are weakly significantly different 
from zero. In the output forecast, the coefficients on the output forecast, b, are 
mostly negative after t = 2. Similarly the R2 values for inflation are low, around 
0.1 until t = 2, (but this at least is better than the value of less than 0.1 for output 
until t = 1). 
 
So, the traditional measures of forecasting accuracy, e.g. MAE, RMSE, 
unbiassedness, can be met well enough, especially during periods of stability, by 
forecasting that the relevant variables will return to their average trend. This is, in 
effect, what the forecasters at the Bank did at the longer horizons since 1993, 
because policy was set, explicitly in the case of RPI(X), to drive that variable back 
to target at the forecast horizon. If one instead, as here, examines the more testing 
criteria, whether the forecasters could predict the fluctuations around the trend, the 
results demonstrate virtually zero ability to do so, until the horizons become rather 
short, t = 3 or lower, too late to take countervailing action. 
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But that latter qualification is crucial. If no countervailing action is possible, (as 
with forecasts of weather, earthquakes, etc.), then failure to forecast fluctuations is 
pure failure. But if counter-vailing action is possible, then the initial (ex ante, 
prior to the MPC decision) forecast has the key role of informing policy actions. 
Those policy actions should offset deviations from target (desired trend), 
eliminating predicted deviations, until the lags in the transmission mechanism 
make that impossible; so that the ex post forecasts (prepared after the resulting 
MPC decision), which is what are published in the Inflation Report, and what we 
show here, should, at the longer horizons, show no correlation between current 
fluctuations (from target) in output growth and inflation and prior longer-term 
predictions of those same variables. Thus our results in this Section, of R2 and b 
coefficients of approximately zero for output growth until t = 3, and low for 
inflation forecasts until short horizons could be seen as evidence of the optimal 
inter-play of forecasting and policy response, not as evidence of lousy forecasting 
ability. As Blinder and Goldfeld note (1972, p. 588),  
“Typically, an authority that is conducting an effective stabilization 
program will appear to have a very small (and statistically insignificant) 
multiplier in simple reduced form experiments, and, conversely, an 
ineffective authority will get a large (and statistically significant) 
multiplier.” 
 
The objective of policy should, surely, be to reduce the predictable component of 
fluctuations in inflation, or output to zero. There is no reason to believe that 
inherently unpredictable shocks to the (world) economy should have an (upwards 
or downwards) trend. Thus the finding that the predictable component of 
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fluctuations has declined to zero whereas the predictable component has 
remained constant is, on this view, consistent with an optimal combination of 
forecast and policy.  
 
There are, however, other explanations of the ‘Great Moderation’, in particular 
that it is due to good luck rather than good policy. Thus Benati and Mumtaz 
(2005), using a Bayesian time-varying parameterised structural VAR conclude 
that, p. 1 (and p. 19):- 
“Our evidence points towards a dominant role played by good luck in 
fostering the more stable macroeconomic environment of the last two 
decades. Results from counterfactual simulations, in particular, show that 
(1) if the volatility of non-policy shocks had been, over the entire sample 
period, the same as that over the most recent years, the Great Inflation 
would have never happened; and (2) ‘bringing the Monetary Policy 
Committee back in time’ would have affected macroeconomic outcomes 
only to a minor extent.” 
 
To reach a similar result by a rather simpler route, note that the scale of  interest 
changes made by the MPC since 1993 have been quite small, in comparison with 
those made in the previous 30 years. Our best estimates of the transmission 
mechanism (see Monetary Policy Committee, 1999) indicates that such policy 
moves will only have shifted output and inflation slightly from their prior course. 
So, that prior course must itself have been quite stable, in order to enable the ex 
post time path of inflation and output to be as stable as it has been. 
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There are some potential responses to this.10 First, many of the shocks affecting 
an open economy, such as the UK, originate abroad. So, if good (monetary) 
policies abroad make the world outside more stable, then the UK will benefit. 
Thus UK policy may not have needed to be so active in the last twenty years 
because Volcker and Greenspan have stabilised the US economy. The 
Benati/Mumtaz exercise treats the UK as a closed economy, concentrating on a 
three variable VAR for output, inflation and interest rates, without specific 
consideration of external shocks. 
 
Second, some large part of the auto-regressive structure of the economy depends 
on forward-looking expectations. In so far as these expectations are transformed 
in a stabilising manner by a systematic shift in monetary policy (n.b. the impulse 
response functions to monetary policy shocks will by definition miss any such 
effect, as Rudebusch [1996] noted in his critique of the VAR approach), then that 
policy will have had an extra stabilising effect on the economy. Such an effect 
might well be difficult to pick up in a VAR approach 
 
Third, if ‘good luck’ is held to account for the reduction in volatility, why should 
it have impacted solely on the predictable component of volatility, and not at all 
on the unpredicted? Would not one have expected ‘good luck’ to reduce the 
unpredicted shocks as much as the predictable element? What is the special nature 
                                                 
10   Also Cecchetti, et al., (2004), in their Working Paper on ‘Has monetary policy become more 
efficient? A cross country analysis’ reach diametrically opposite conclusions, finding that 
monetary policy improvements have been the major cause of the greater stability. 
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of this ‘good luck’ that has this pattern of effects? Thus the very nature of the 
pattern of reduction in overall volatility, as between the predicted and unpredicted 
elements, goes to support the hypothesis that what has been happening has been 
due to improvements in the forecasting/policy mix. 
 
4. The interaction of the lag structure of shocks, forecasts, policy and 
outcomes 
 
The transmission mechanism of monetary policy involves long lags. If shocks 
only had a very short-lived transitory effect on the economy, then there would be 
no point in using monetary policy to try to offset them, since their effect would 
have disappeared before policy measures could be brought to bear. It follows that 
the shocks to the economy that matter for policy purposes are those with some 
considerable persistence. Indeed, the shocks that concern policy-makers, such as 
the 1997/98 Asian crisis, oil price shocks, asset price booms and busts (such as 
housing), the impact of the Olympic games, technology shocks, etc., etc., do have 
effects on an economy that can be expected to persist for many quarters, even 
though they will eventually die away. Often their peak effect may come several 
quarters after they are first observed. 
 
In Goodhart (2005a) I sought to demonstrate that the MPC has reacted to a 
(perceived) shock to expected inflation by adjusting interest rates so that forecast 
inflation is driven back to target inflation at its main policy horizon of 7/9 quarters 
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hence. If so, that (perceived) shock will lead to an expected divergence between 
inflation and target at all shorter horizons, with the gap depending on the margin 
between the persistent time path of the shock, (as perceived at time t), and the 
increasing effect of the countervailing policy measure. This is shown in Diagram 
2, where the time path of the effect of the shock has been arbitrarily selected. 
 
 
Area marked by grey tone shows the intermediate effect of shock on inflation. 
 
Area marked by x x shows the offset to a shock, fully offset at t=8, which is offset 
by policy in the intermediate quarters. 
 
 
As the diagram shows, the combination of the persistence of shocks, the lags in 
the effect of monetary policy and the (implicit) choice of a policy horizon at about 
7/8 quarters hence, has the following implications. First, the variance of forecast 
inflation will be considerably higher at intermediate horizons (4 or 5 quarters 
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hence for example) than at the policy horizon. Second, since shocks are, by 
definition, unpredictable, but once occurred persistent, the errors in forecasting 
will be auto-correlated. So, if at time t, the forecaster made an error in forecasting 
inflation at time t+i, that same signed error is likely to recur at time t+i+1. So the 
first order autocorrelation of forecast errors, going horizontally, ought to be high. 
We record the actual experience of forecast errors in inflation in Table 6. 
 
If the scale and persistence of the shocks was perfectly perceived, then the error at 
time t in forecasting inflation at time t+i, should not be correlated with the error at 
time t+1 in forecasting inflation at time t+i; that is the first order auto-correlation 
of forecast errors, going downwards ought, in principle, to be zero. In practice, it 
is usually hard to perceive at the outset which shocks will become large in effect 
and persistent. So there is quite likely to be initial underestimates of the scale of 
the major shocks. Thus we may expect some positive first-order auto-correlation 
of forecast errors, but its scale should be much lower than that of the horizontal 
auto-correlation of forecast errors. 
 
Third, and contrary to some theoretical expectations, if the effect of shocks should 
rise to a peak a few quarters after it is first observed, as in the case shown in 
Diagram 2, the standard deviation of the forecast errors will themselves be likely 
to be hump-shaped, with the position of the hump dependent on the (average) time 
paths of shocks and their policy counter-measures. 
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Fourth, and finally, given the time paths of the persistence of the shock and the 
lags in the effect of policy, then, with a policy horizon at t = 8, only a relatively 
small proportion of the effect of a shock will be offset in the intermediate period. 
This is also shown in Diagram 2. 
 
We can demonstrate that all four hypotheses hold in the case of the UK for 
inflation, for our data set running from 1993 Q1 to 2003 Q3. First, the average 
variance of forecasts of inflation, (constant interest rate, modal forecast), is as 
shown below:- 
 
Inflation Report 
RPI(X) 
 
Forecast at Horizon  Out-turn t = 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Mean 2.5 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 
Standard 
Deviation 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.2 
 
 
The errors in the forecasts for inflation are shown in Table 6. From this table, it is 
simple to extract the first order auto-correlations, and the standard deviations of 
the errors, which are as follows:- 
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First order auto-correlations Bank RPIX 
First order auto-correlations of the forecast errors going downwards: 
 
T= 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 
 
 0.434 0.356 0.530 0.626 0.686 0.583 0.551 0.306 -0.162 
 
 
First order auto-correlations of forecast errors going horizontally: 
 
T= 8/7 7/6 6/5 5/4 4/3 3/2 2/1 1/0 
 
 0.882 0.850 0.818 0.838 0.857 0.829 0.833 0.666 
 
 
As hypothesized the auto-correlation of forecasting errors going horizontally is 
high, and much higher than the auto-correlation going downwards. 
 
Interestingly, and contrary to theoretical expectations (see Benati 2003b, Section 
5.1), the standard deviations of the forecasting errors themselves are hump-
shaped, rising from t = 0 to t = 4 and then declining again until t = 8 for both 
output and inflation. 
 
Standard deviations of the forecast errors: 
 
T= 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 
 0.26 0.41 0.47 0.53 0.57 0.53 0.51 0.42 0.38 
 
 
Both the variances in inflation forecasts and in the errors in such forecasts would 
be hump-shaped on the assumption that disturbances may build over time and 
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offsetting policy measures are slow to take effect. Equally the horizontal auto-
correlation of forecast errors is high, as must be the case if shocks are persistent; 
and such auto-correlations are much higher than those going downwards, though 
these latter in turn are higher than might have been expected if the first estimate of 
the shock/disturbance was accurate. 
 
Finally we review how far policy has offset shocks at intermediate dates between t 
= 8, where we rely on Goodhart (2005a) to the effect that the offset was forecast 
to be complete (100%) at t = 8, so that the subsequent deviation of inflation from 
target is entirely due to later shocks, unforeseen at the time of the initial forecast 
eight quarters previously. Here we have the advantage that in 1999 the Monetary 
Policy Committee authorised a publication on ‘The Transmission Mechanism of 
Monetary Policy’, (largely prepared by the staff), showing diagrammatically on 
page 12 the effect of a 1% change in interest rates, maintained for one year and 
then reversed, on both output and inflation on the basis of two alternative 
simulations. Since there seemed few grounds for choosing between these, I took 
the average, mean, of the two, and translated that, by eye, into numerical 
estimates. 
 
For my purposes, however, I want a rule of thumb for a change in interest rates 
maintained over two years, until t = 8, not just one. For inflation there is no 
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problem, since the lags are so long that the results are equivalent.11  Moreover, 
interest rate changes are not made only in the forecasting (Inflation Report, IR) 
month, but in the two preceding months as well, (though the frequency of making 
such adjustments, for some fairly obvious reasons, is higher in the IR month than 
in the other (not IR) months). So we need to take account of these as well. 
 
Be that as it may, the rule-of-thumb adjustments to be made to the forecasts of 
inflation for interest rate changes are shown in Table 7, and the actual historical 
changes in interest rates, and the resulting implied changes in the inflation 
forecasts are shown in Table 8. Note that a change in interest rates in say Q1 1999 
will affect output in Q2 1999, Q3 1999, etc., so the way that we have set up the 
tables, the effects run diagonally downwards from left to right in Table 8. 
 
Taking advantage of the finding (Goodhart 2005a) that the MPC drove forecast 
inflation back close to target (2.5%) at the horizon of t = 8 at all times, I can then 
take the deviation between the inflation outcome and the forecast for that same 
quarter eight quarters previously as the sum of intermediate (unforeseen) shocks 
and (offsetting) policy effects. So I can then calculate how much policy has offset 
such shocks in the intermediate period (up to the policy horizon at t = 8). This is 
reported in Table 9.   
 
11   The Bank of England has introduced a new quarterly model, (BEQM, see News Release on 
April 22, 2004), in which the responses to interest rate changes of inflation (somewhat quicker) 
and of output (somewhat larger) are slightly different from those used in this paper. See the article 
on `The new Bank of England Quarterly Model’, accompanying the News Release, and available 
on its website, especially Charts 1 and 2, p. 5. 
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A positive value for ‘policy change’ implies that the sum of the effects of interest 
rate changes between t = 8 and t = 0 was expansionary on inflation. We show, in 
column 2, the difference between the outcome, for RPIX (Table 9) and the 
concurrent forecast at t = 0. For inflation the difference between the concurrent 
forecast in the middle month of the quarter and the end-quarter outcome at t = 0 
was on average tiny, and randomly distributed. Then we show the difference 
between the forecasts at t = 8 and t = 0. This difference has a strong first-order 
positive auto-correlation (0.51, p = 0.004). We can then decompose this into the 
accumulated policy response (as estimated) and therefore the residual forecast 
change, primarily from intervening unforeseen shocks. Again both the policy 
responses, and the unforeseen shocks, show strong first-order positive 
autocorrelation.  
 
The initial forecast (t = 8) for RPIX has, however, been on average very slightly 
above the outcome, both over the full period and since operational independence 
in 1997 Q2, as already reported in Goodhart (2004a). The outcomes, however, 
have closely matched the target value of 2.5%; so the average value of column 5 
has been negative (-0.25, S.E. 0.4 over full period, F.P.; -0.22, S.E. 0.36 since 
operational independence, OI). Inflation was probably initially overestimated, 
until Q2 1996, because of an expectation of a greater pass-through (than actually 
occurred) onto domestic prices of the sharp devaluation of end 1992. The other 
main period, when prospective inflation was initially over-forecast, was between 
 32
1998 Q3 and 1999 Q2. This reflected a feeling in 1996 and early 1997 (before 
OI) that Chancellor Clarke had failed to raise interest rates enough. With a 
combination of a subsequent strong rise in rates (note that the negative policy 
response in these quarters exceeds the unanticipated shocks) and the deflationary 
effect of the Asian crisis, this mini-surge in inflation was halted. 
 
There is, as one might hope to find, a negative association between the policy 
response and the unanticipated subsequent shocks, but it is not particularly 
pronounced; the signs are opposite 23x, similar 11x, and zero 2x, over FP; 
(opposite 14x, similar 9x, zero 2x, under OI).  
 
A regression,  
 Policy Changet = a + b Forecast Changet, 
does, however, show a significant offsetting effect: Thus 
a = 0.01 
(0.76) 
b = -0.16 
(0.06)
R2 = 0.10 FP 
a = 0.01 
(0.83) 
b = -0.26 
(0.07)
R2 = 0.14 OI 
 
The strength of the correct counter-vailing policy response has, apparently, 
increased since OI. The difficulty of forecasting shocks, that need offsetting, may 
well be the explanation of the low R2. Moreover a given subsequent change in 
forecast inflation, unanticipated at t = 8, only produces a policy offset somewhere 
about one fifth of the former’s size. But this should not be surprising. Given the 
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long lags in putting offsetting monetary policy into action, this is, as Diagram 2 
shows graphically, what one should have expected in the first place. When a 
subsequent shock occurs near to the out-turn date, say within a year, there is 
nothing that the MPC can, or should try to, do about it. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The record of the Bank forecasters in predicting output growth and inflation is 
good by the standard criteria of MAE, RMSE and unbiassedness. Looking at this 
more closely, however, reveals that, since 1993, this has been because these 
forecasters have predicted that these variables would remain close to trend/target, 
and this has been broadly what has occurred. If, instead, the criterion is whether 
the forecasters can predict deviations around the average trend/target, then the 
results have been dire. In equations of the form Outcome = a + b Forecast, the 
values of R2 and of b have been approximately zero (rather than one) until the 
horizon has become fairly short (two, or three, quarters, or less). 
 
Superficially this may seem to represent forecast failure, but this would only be so 
if the forecasting process could not itself influence policy, which then drives the 
variables back to their desired target. Indeed long-horizon values of R2 of zero 
may reflect an optimal forecast/policy procedure. Only when the lag length is 
such as to make it impossible/undesirable to use the instrument to drive the 
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objectives back to target should we see the values of R2 and b returning towards 
one. 
 
Since the transmission mechanism of monetary policy has long lags, only 
persistent shocks will be of concern to the monetary authorities. Earlier work 
(Goodhart 2005a) suggests that in the UK the MPC has attempted to offset the 
effect of inflationary shocks at t = 7/8. Given this, and depending on the actual 
time paths of auto-correlated (i.e. persistent) shocks and of the transmission 
mechanism of monetary policy, both the variance of (ex post) inflation forecasts 
and of errors in that inflation forecast will tend to be hump-shaped; the 
(horizontal) auto-correlation in forecast errors will be high, and much higher than 
the vertical auto-correlation; the proportion of unforeseen shocks offset by policy 
measures between t = 8 (when the offset is complete) and t = 0 will appear low, 
even in those cases when forecasting is optimal and policy succeeds completely in 
its chosen purpose (i.e. to return inflation to target at t = 8). We show that the data 
for inflation forecasts and outcomes between 1993 and 2003 are consistent with 
all these hypotheses.  
 
There are several further channels of research that this line of work suggests. 
First, there is the question of whether the ‘Great Moderation’ in (predictable) 
volatility was due to good luck or to good policy. There are arguments to be 
advanced on both sides of that question, and analytical complications in 
addressing this question, several of which were briefly mentioned in Section 3. I 
 35
hope to work further with Benati on this question. Then there is the question of 
why money markets yield curves have been such poor predictors of future short-
term interest rates. I intend to examine whether errors in interest rate forecasts are 
correlated with errors made (by the MPC) in forecasts of output and inflation. 
Finally there is the issue of why, if shocks are random in arrival (and the MPC 
attempts to offset them fully at t = 8), the time path of interest rate changes is 
nonetheless one of small, same-signed, consecutive changes in interest rates. This 
issue is closely akin to the question of why there is positive, first-order vertical 
auto-correlation in forecast errors. Having tended to under (over) estimate 
inflation at t + i at time t, why is there a tendency for forecasters to make the same 
signed under/over) estimate for inflation at t + i at time t + 1? When a big shock 
does come, there has seemed to be some tendency for forecasters to under-
estimate its true virulence initially, and to need time to assess its full scale. Is this 
a common problem in forecasting? If so, why? 
 
Bibliography 
 
Bank of England, (2004), `The new Bank of England Quarterly Model’, April, 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/mpc/qtlymodel.pdf.  
Bank of England, (2004), `The new Bank of England Quarterly Model’, April, 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/mpc/qtlymodel.pdf.  
Benati, L., (2004), `Evolving Post-World War II UK Economic Performance’, 
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 36 (4), 691-717.  
Benati, L. and H. Mumtaz, (2005), ‘The “Great Stability” in the UK: Good Policy 
or Good Luck?’, Bank of England, paper in progress. 
 36
Boivin, J., (2004), `Has U.S. Monetary Policy Changed?  Evidence from 
Drifting Coefficients and Real-Time Data’, Graduate School of Business, 
Columbia University, work in progress, January version.  
Buiter, W.H., (1984), `Granger-Causality and Policy Effectiveness’, Economica, 
51, (202), May: 151-62.  
Campbell, S.D., (2004), ‘Macroeconomic Volatility: Predictability and 
Uncertainty in the Great Moderation: Evidence from the Survey of Professional 
Forecasters’, Federal Reserve Board, Finance and Economics Discussion Series, 
2004-52. 
Castle, J. and C. Ellis, (2002), `Building a real-time database for GDP(E)’, Bank 
of England Quarterly Bulletin, 42, (1): 42-9.  
Ceccheti, S.G., Flores-Lagunes, A. and S. Krause, (2004), ‘Has monetary policy 
become more efficient?  A cross country analysis’, NBER Working Paper # 
10973, (December). 
Clements, M.P., (2004), `Evaluating the Bank of England Density Forecasts of 
Inflation’, Economic Journal, 114 (498), 844-866.  
Goldfeld, S.M. and A.S. Blinder, (1972), `Some Implications of Endogenous 
Stabilization Policy’, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, No. 3, 585-60.  
Goodhart, C.A.E., (2004), `What is the Monetary Policy Committee Attempting to 
Achieve?’, in Macroeconomics, Monetary Policy, and Financial Stability: A 
Festschrift in Honour of Charles Freedman, Proceedings of a Conference held by 
the Bank of Canada, June 2003, (Ottawa: Bank of Canada).  
Goodhart, C.A.E., (2005a), ‘The Monetary Policy Committee’s Reaction 
Function: An Exercise in Estimates’, Berkeley Electronic Journals, forthcoming. 
Goodhart, C.A.E., (2005b), ‘The Interest Rate Conditioning Assumption’, paper 
presented at the Conference in Memory of J.S. Flemming, Wadham and Nuffield 
Colleges, Oxford, September 9/10. 
King, M.A., (2000), `Monetary Policy: Theory in Practice’, address to the joint 
luncheon of the American Economic Association and the American Finance 
Association, Boston Marriott Hotel, 7 January 2000. See Bank of England 
website, http://194.129.36.50/speeches/speech67.htm.  
McCallum, T., (1999), `Issues in the Design of Monetary Policy Rules’, in Taylor, 
John B. and Michael Woodford, eds, Handbook of Macroeconomics, Amsterdam:  
Elsevier.  
 37
Monetary Policy Committee (earlier Bank of England), 1993 – to date), 
Inflation Report, (Bank of England). 
Monetary Policy Committee, Bank of England, (1999), `The Transmission 
Mechanism of Monetary Policy’, pamphlet, Bank of England.  
Orphanides, A., (2003), `The Quest for Prosperity without Inflation’, Journal of 
Monetary Economics, 50 (3), 633-663, April.  
Orphanides, A. and J.C. Williams, (2004), `Robust Monetary Policy with 
Imperfect Knowledge’, paper presented at European Central Bank Conference on 
`Monetary policy and imperfect knowledge’, Wurzburg, Germany, (October).  
Reifschneider, D.L., Stockton, D.J. and D. Wilcox, (1997), `Econometric models 
and the monetary policy process’, Carnegie Rochester Conference Series on 
Public Policy, 47, 1-37.  
Rudebusch, G., (1996), ‘Do Measures of Monetary Policy in a VAR make 
sense?’, Banca d’Italia Working Paper, # 269, (May).  
Schuh, S., (2001), ‘An Evaluation of Recent Forecast Errors’, New England 
Economic Review, January/February, 35-56. 
Statistics Commission, (2004), Revisions to Economic Statistics; Vol. 1, Report 
by Statistics Commission; Vol. 2, Review by National Institute of Economic and 
Social Research; Vol. 3, Annexes, (London: Statistics Commission), (April).  
Tobin, J. (1970), `Money and Income: post hoc ergo propter hoc’, Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 84, (May), 301-17.  
Tulip, P., (2005), ‘Has Output beome more Predictable? Changes in the 
Greenbook Forecast Errors’, Federal Reserve Board, Draft paper, (May). 
Wallis, K.F., (1999), `Asymmetric density forecasts of inflation and the Bank of 
England’s fan chart’, National Institute Economic Review, vol. 167, pp. 106-12.  
Wallis, K.F., (2003), `Chi-squared tests of interval and density forecasts, and the 
Bank of England’s fan charts’, International Journal of Forecasting, vol. 19, pp. 
165-76.  
Wallis, K.F., (2004), `An assessment of Bank of England and National Institutes 
forecast uncertainties’, National Institute Economic Review, vol. 189, pp. 64-71.  
Walsh, C.E., (2003), `Implications of a Changing Economic Structure for the 
Strategy of Monetary Policy’, in Monetary Policy and Uncertainty:  Adopting to a 
Changing Economy, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.  
 38
Woodford, M., (1994), `Nonstandard Indicators for Monetary Policy: Can their 
Usefulness be Judged from Forecasting Regressions?’, in Mankiw, N.G., ed., 
Monetary Policy, University of Chicago Press for the National Bureau of 
Economic Research, pp 95-115. 
  
 39
Table 1 
Bank Forecast of RPIX 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Forecast t =  
 
 
RPIX (% 
change over 
12 months) 
0 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1993 Q1 3.50 3.50         
Q2 2.80 3.40 3.40        
Q3 3.30 2.90 3.40 3.00       
Q4 2.70 3.30 3.00 3.20 3.10      
1994 Q1 2.40 2.80 3.60 3.20 3.20 3.40     
Q2 2.40 2.70 3.00 3.50 3.30 3.50 3.40    
Q3 2.00 2.30 2.90 3.10 3.50 3.30 3.60 3.40   
Q4 2.50 2.10 2.60 3.00 3.20 3.40 3.30 3.70 3.30  
1995 Q1 2.80 2.90 1.90 2.70 3.10 3.40 3.40 3.50   
Q2 2.80 2.70 2.80 2.00 3.00 3.40 3.30 3.40 3.60  
Q3 3.10 2.90 3.00 3.10 2.30 3.20 3.40 3.20   
Q4 3.00 3.20 3.00 3.10 3.20 2.40 3.20 3.30 3.20  
1996 Q1 2.90 2.80 3.30 3.20 3.40 2.70 2.80 3.40 3.30  
Q2 2.80 2.70 2.70 3.50 3.50 3.80 2.70 2.40 3.10  
Q3 2.90 2.70 2.50 2.40 3.20 3.40 3.70 2.60 2.40  
Q4 3.10 3.10 2.40 2.30 2.20 3.00 3.20 3.40 2.50  
1997 Q1 2.70 2.70 2.90 2.30 2.30 2.30 2.70 2.90 3.00  
Q2 2.70 2.60 2.40 2.80 2.30 2.20 2.30 2.70 2.80  
Q3 2.70 2.65 2.40 2.20 2.70 2.40 2.40 2.30 2.70 2.80 
Q4 2.70 2.60 2.32 2.20 2.20 2.40 2.50 2.40 2.40 2.70 
1998 Q1 2.60 2.60 2.51 2.19 2.20 2.30 2.40 2.60 2.40 2.40 
Q2 2.80 2.83 2.63 2.42 2.06 2.20 2.50 2.50 2.70 2.50 
Q3 2.50 2.51 2.35 2.42 2.27 1.99 2.30 2.70 2.60 2.80 
Q4 2.60 2.54 2.56 2.35 2.41 2.19 2.08 2.50 2.80 2.70 
1999 Q1 2.70 2.49 2.56 2.69 2.41 2.44 2.18 2.24 2.70 2.90 
Q2 2.20 2.48 2.53 2.71 2.82 2.37 2.39 2.25 2.36 2.90 
Q3 2.10 2.31 2.40 2.55 2.74 2.86 2.30 2.47 2.37 2.50 
Q4 2.20 2.20 2.28 2.36 2.61 2.59 2.77 2.26 2.55 2.42 
2000 Q1 2.00 1.93 2.12 2.09 2.20 2.52 2.56 2.69 2.27 2.64 
Q2 2.20 1.88 1.98 2.06 1.99 2.23 2.49 2.51 2.56 2.35 
Q3 2.20 2.38 1.93 1.95 2.02 1.88 2.25 2.47 2.48 2.47 
Q4 2.00 2.36 2.28 2.10 2.05 1.84 1.92 2.23 2.47 2.45 
2001 Q1 1.90 1.94 2.33 2.26 2.20 2.32 1.72 2.08 2.35 2.56 
Q2 2.40 1.90 1.92 2.22 2.39 2.47 2.48 1.80 2.28 2.43 
Q3 2.30 2.31 1.90 1.87 2.19 2.48 2.53 2.53 2.19 2.59 
Q4 1.90 2.00 2.17 1.91 1.87 2.19 2.62 2.53 2.56 2.53 
2002 Q1 2.30 2.14 2.03 2.17 1.91 2.09 2.18 2.68 2.53 2.58 
Q2 1.50 2.02 1.87 1.85 1.91 1.94 2.18 2.37 2.70 2.56 
Q3 2.10 1.84 2.08 1.96 2.06 1.96 2.03 2.27 2.46 2.72 
Q4 2.70 2.64 2.25 2.24 2.11 2.06 2.13 2.16 2.42 2.56 
2003 Q1 3.00 2.77 2.73 2.25 2.18 2.13 2.08 2.32 2.39 2.55 
Q2 2.80 3.09 2.90 2.72 2.25 2.05 2.13 2.15 2.41 2.53 
Q3 2.80 2.85 2.90 2.98 2.72 2.31 2.09 2.18 2.23 2.45 
  
40
Table 2 
Bank Forecast of GDP 
 
Forecast t = 
 
Output 
(% growth) 
2003 
estimate 
Output 
(% growth) 
contemp- 
oraneous 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1997 Q3 3.19 3.89 3.39         
Q4 3.36 3.93 4.02 2.82        
1998 Q1 3.38 2.88 3.04 3.54 2.37       
Q2 2.79 2.47 2.41 2.33 2.84 1.85      
Q3 3.51 2.40 1.99 1.86 1.76 2.11 1.80     
Q4 2.82 2.02 1.95 1.66 1.71 1.64 1.33 1.83    
1999 Q1 2.72 1.70 1.16 1.28 1.41 1.76 1.59 1.41 2.03   
Q2 2.61 1.64 0.79 0.77 1.00 1.19 1.83 1.79 1.64 2.38  
Q3 2.60 2.30 1.32 0.99 0.68 0.84 1.29 2.11 2.15 1.93 2.63 
Q4 3.26 2.75 2.50 1.90 1.20 0.83 1.01 1.54 2.27 2.41 2.33 
2000 Q1 3.96 3.11 2.92 2.82 2.41 1.49 1.36 1.33 1.69 2.39 2.61 
Q2 4.30 3.36 2.94 2.70 2.80 2.58 1.72 1.82 1.65 2.09 2.56 
Q3 3.94 2.98 2.56 2.58 2.47 2.51 2.73 1.99 2.24 2.02 2.44 
Q4 2.93 2.72 2.73 2.48 2.45 2.24 2.42 2.80 2.58 2.61 2.48 
2001 Q1 2.56 3.01 2.86 2.76 2.50 2.57 2.27 2.61 2.92 2.97 2.83 
Q2 2.23 2.65 2.25 2.30 2.39 2.51 2.61 2.35 2.70 3.01 3.11 
Q3 1.80 2.24 1.62 2.03 2.07 2.31 2.53 2.65 2.38 2.82 3.02 
Q4 1.95 1.71 2.09 1.82 2.46 2.22 2.40 2.63 2.70 2.39 2.83 
2002 Q1 1.44 1.37 1.37 1.92 1.98 2.68 2.10 2.48 2.81 2.74 2.39 
Q2 1.55 1.75 1.35 1.48 1.97 2.26 2.72 2.37 2.51 2.79 2.70 
Q3 1.93 2.26 1.82 1.62 1.78 2.05 2.42 2.71 2.62 2.50 2.76 
Q4 1.99 2.31 2.29 2.34 2.32 2.43 2.27 2.33 2.48 2.81 2.48 
2003 Q1 1.84 2.10 2.53 3.06 2.91 2.95 2.76 2.49 2.24 2.42 2.89 
Q2 1.98 1.84 2.38 2.58 3.18 2.75 2.95 2.79 2.66 2.15 2.42 
Q3 1.89 1.89 1.59 2.00 2.33 3.17 2.94 3.15 2.69 2.70 2.11 
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Table 3 
RPIX Inflation Errors 
 
 Average Error Average Absolute 
Error 
Sample Size 
One-year-ahead errors 
Constant rate mode 
Constant rate mean 
Market rate mode 
Market rate mean 
 
0.1 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
 
0.3 
0.3 
0.3 
0.3 
 
20 
20 
18 
18 
Two-year-ahead errors 
Constant rate mode 
Constant rate mean 
Market rate mode 
Market rate mean 
 
-0.3 
-0.4 
-0.3 
-0.3 
 
0.4 
0.5 
0.4 
0.4 
 
16 
16 
14 
14 
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Table 4 
Predictive Ability of Forecasts for RPI 
 
Bank : Regression: Actual = a + bForecast(t+i) 
 
 
i= 
a 
(p-value) 
St. Er. 
b 
(p-value) 
St. Er. 
R2 DW Time Period 
 
0 
 
0.488 
(0.04) 
0.232 
0.801 
(0.00) 
0.089 
 
0.66 
 
2.20 
1993:Q1 
 
2003:Q3 
 
1 
 
1.31 
(0.00) 
0.300 
0.47 
(0.00) 
0.116 
 
0.29 
 
1.20 
1993:Q2 
 
2003:Q3 
 
2 
 
1.61 
(0.00) 
0.311 
0.36 
(0.00) 
0.121 
 
0.18 
 
0.80 
1993:Q3 
 
2003:Q3 
 
3 
 
1.92 
(0.00) 
0.302 
0.22 
(0.06) 
0.117 
 
0.08 
 
0.79 
1993:Q4 
 
2003:Q3 
 
4 
 
1.96 
(0.00) 
0.289 
0.20 
(0.07) 
0.111 
 
0.08 
 
0.66 
1994:Q1 
 
2003:Q3 
 
5 
 
1.83 
(0.00) 
0.311 
0.25 
(0.03) 
0.118 
 
0.11 
 
0.71 
1994:Q2 
 
2003:Q3 
 
6 
 
1.77 
(0.00) 
0.355 
0.27 
(0.04) 
0.133 
 
0.10 
 
0.68 
1994:Q3 
 
2003:Q3 
 
7 
 
1.40 
(0.00) 
0.439 
0.41 
(0.01) 
0.163 
 
0.11 
 
0.82 
1994:Q4 
 
2003:Q3 
 
8 
 
1.52 
(0.25) 
1.297 
0.32 
(0.52) 
0.501 
 
0.01 
 
0.87 
1997:Q3 
 
2003:Q3 
Data set: Bank RPI Forecast 
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Table 5 
Predictive Ability of Forecasts for GDP 
 
GDPActual = a + b Forecast (t+i) 
 
.i= 
a 
(p-value) 
St. Er. 
b 
(p-value) 
St Er. 
R2 DW Time Period 
 
0 
 
0.71 
(0.00) 
0.21 
0.77 
(0.00) 
0.09 
 
0.75 
 
1.09 
1997:3 
 
2003:3 
 
1 
 
1.15 
(0.00) 
0.35 
0.57 
(0.00) 
0.15 
 
0.38 
 
0.84 
1997:4 
 
2003:3 
 
2 
 
1.81 
(0.00) 
0.39 
0.24 
(0.19) 
0.18 
 
0.07 
 
0.47 
1998:1 
 
2003:3 
 
3 
 
2.41 
(0.00) 
0.42 
-0.05 
(0.77) 
0.19 
 
0.00 
 
0.43 
1998:2 
 
2003:3 
 
4 
 
2.71 
(0.00) 
0.46 
-0.19 
(0.35) 
0.20 
 
0.04 
 
0.43 
1998:3 
 
2003:3 
 
5 
 
2.95 
(0.00) 
0.58 
-0.29 
(0.25) 
0.25 
 
0.07 
 
0.45 
1998:4 
 
2003:3 
 
6 
 
3.23 
(0.00) 
0.82 
-0.39 
(0.26) 
0.34 
 
0.07 
 
0.45 
1999:1 
 
2003:3 
 
7 
 
3.03 
(0.01) 
1.10 
-0.28 
(0.53) 
0.43 
 
0.02 
 
0.46 
1999:2 
 
2003:3 
 
8 
 
1.90 
(0.21) 
1.45 
0.17 
(0.75) 
0.55 
 
0.00 
 
0.35 
1999:3 
 
2003:3 
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Table 6 
Differential between RPIX and forecast 
 RPIX 
(% change 
over 12) 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1993 3.5 0                 
Q2 2.8 -0.6 -0.6     
Q3 3.3 0.4 -0.1 0.3     
Q4 2.7 -0.6 -0.3 -0.5 -0.4     
1994 Q1 2.4 -0.4 -1.2 -0.8 -0.8 -1     
Q2 2.4 -0.3 -0.6 -1.1 -0.9 -1.1 -1     
Q3 2 -0.3 -0.9 -1.1 -1.5 -1.3 -1.6 -1.4     
Q4 2.5 0.4 -0.1 -0.5 -0.7 -0.9 -0.8 -1.2 -0.8   
1995 Q1 2.8 -0.1 0.9 0.1 -0.3 -0.6 -0.6 -0.7     
Q2 2.8 0.1 0 0.8 -0.2 -0.6 -0.5 -0.6 -0.8   
Q3 3.1 0.2 0.1 0 0.8 -0.1 -0.3 -0.1     
Q4 3 -0.2 0 -0.1 -0.2 0.6 -0.2 -0.3 -0.2   
1996 Q1 2.9 0.1 -0.4 -0.3 -0.5 0.2 0.1 -0.5 -0.4   
Q2 2.8 0.1 0.1 -0.7 -0.7 -1 0.1 0.4 -0.3   
Q3 2.9 0.2 0.4 0.5 -0.3 -0.5 -0.8 0.3 0.5   
Q4 3.1 0 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.1 -0.1 -0.3 0.6   
1997 Q1 2.7 0 -0.2 0.4 0.4 0.4 0 -0.2 -0.3   
Q2 2.7 0.1 0.3 -0.1 0.4 0.5 0.4 0 -0.1   
Q3 2.7 0.05 0.3 0.5 0 0.3 0.3 0.4 0 -0.1
Q4 2.7 0.1 0.38 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 0 
1998 Q1 2.6 0 0.09 0.41 0.4 0.3 0.2 0 0.2 0.2
Q2 2.8 -0.03 0.17 0.38 0.74 0.6 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.3
Q3 2.5 -0.01 0.15 0.08 0.23 0.51 0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -0.3
Q4 2.6 0.06 0.04 0.25 0.19 0.41 0.52 0.1 -0.2 -0.1
1999 Q1 2.7 0.21 0.14 0.01 0.29 0.26 0.52 0.46 0 -0.2
Q2 2.2 -0.28 -0.33 -0.51 -0.62 -0.17 -0.19 -0.05 -0.16 -0.7
Q3 2.1 -0.21 -0.3 -0.45 -0.64 -0.76 -0.2 -0.37 -0.27 -0.4
Q4 2.2 0 -0.08 -0.16 -0.41 -0.39 -0.57 -0.06 -0.35 -0.22
2000 Q1 2 0.07 -0.12 -0.09 -0.2 -0.52 -0.56 -0.69 -0.27 -0.64
Q2 2.2 0.32 0.22 0.14 0.21 -0.03 -0.29 -0.31 -0.36 -0.15
Q3 2.2 -0.18 0.27 0.25 0.18 0.32 -0.05 -0.27 -0.28 -0.27
Q4 2 -0.36 -0.28 -0.1 -0.05 0.16 0.08 -0.23 -0.47 -0.45
2001 Q1 1.9 -0.04 -0.43 -0.36 -0.3 -0.42 0.18 -0.18 -0.45 -0.66
Q2 2.4 0.5 0.48 0.18 0.01 -0.07 -0.08 0.6 0.12 -0.03
Q3 2.3 -0.01 0.4 0.43 0.11 -0.18 -0.23 -0.23 0.11 -0.29
Q4 1.9 -0.1 -0.27 -0.01 0.03 -0.29 -0.72 -0.63 -0.66 -0.63
2002 Q1 2.3 0.16 0.27 0.13 0.39 0.21 0.12 -0.38 -0.23 -0.28
Q2 1.5 -0.52 -0.37 -0.35 -0.41 -0.44 -0.68 -0.87 -1.2 -1.06
Q3 2.1 0.26 0.02 0.14 0.04 0.14 0.07 -0.17 -0.36 -0.62
Q4 2.7 0.06 0.45 0.46 0.59 0.64 0.57 0.54 0.28 0.14
2003 Q1 3 0.23 0.27 0.75 0.82 0.87 0.92 0.68 0.61 0.45
Q2 2.8 -0.29 -0.1 0.08 0.55 0.75 0.67 0.65 0.39 0.27
Q3 2.8 -0.05 -0.1 -0.18 0.08 0.49 0.71 0.62 0.57 0.35 
 
Table 7 
Assumed Effects of Interest Rate Changes on 
 
RPI 
Quarters after Change 
 
0 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
8 
 
 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0.04 
 
0.11 
 
0.18 
 
0.25 
 
0.32 
 
0.30 
 
1% change* 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0.01 
 
0.03 
 
0.05 
 
0.06 
 
0.08 
 
0.07 
 
¼% change 
 
 
Interest Rate Changes in Months applied to Quarters 
 
Dec – Feb 
 
Q1 
 
Mar – May 
 
Q2 
 
June – Aug 
 
Q3 
 
Sept B Nov 
 
Q4 
 
 
*  The effect of an increase in interest rates being a reduction in inflation (and vice versa). The effects 
are assumed to be symmetrical.  
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Table 8 
Effect on RPIX 
 
Effect on                     
Date Interest Change 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1993 Q1 -1.00                   
Q2                     
Q3                     
Q4 -0.50                   
1994 Q1 -0.25                   
Q2                     
Q3         -0.02     -0.25     
Q4 0.50       -0.01 -0.06     -0.30   
1995 Q1 0.50         -0.03 -0.10     -0.30 
Q2             -0.05 -0.12     
Q3         0.02     -0.06 -0.15   
Q4 -0.25       0.02 0.06     -0.08 -0.15 
1996 Q1 -0.25         0.06 0.10     -0.08 
Q2             0.10 0.12     
Q3 -0.25       -0.01     0.12 0.15   
Q4 0.25       -0.01 -0.03     0.15 0.15 
1997 Q1           -0.03 -0.05     0.15 
Q2 0.25       -0.01   -0.05 -0.06     
Q3 0.75       0.01 -0.03   -0.06 -0.08   
Q4 0.25         0.03 -0.05   -0.08 -0.08 
1998 Q1         0.01   0.05 -0.06   -0.08 
Q2         0.03 0.03   0.06 -0.08   
Q3 0.25       0.01 0.08 0.05   0.08 -0.08 
Q4 -0.75         0.03 0.14 0.06   0.08 
1999 Q1 -1.25           0.05 0.18 0.08   
Q2 -0.25       0.01     0.06 0.24 0.08 
Q3 -0.25       -0.03 0.03     0.08 0.24 
Q4 0.50       -0.05 -0.08 0.05     0.08 
2000 Q1 0.50       -0.01 -0.14 -0.14 0.06     
Q2         -0.01 -0.03 -0.23 -0.18 0.08   
Q3         0.02 -0.03 -0.05 -0.31 -0.24 0.08 
Q4         0.02 0.06 -0.05 -0.06 -0.38 -0.24 
2001 Q1 -0.25         0.06 0.09 -0.06 -0.08 -0.38 
Q2 -0.50           0.09 0.12 -0.08 -0.08 
Q3 -0.25             0.12 0.16 -0.08 
Q4 -1.00       -0.01       0.16 0.16 
2002 Q1         -0.02 -0.03       0.16 
Q2         -0.01 -0.06 -0.05       
Q3         -0.04 -0.03 -0.09 -0.06     
Q4           -0.11 -0.05 -0.12 -0.08   
2003 Q1 -0.25           -0.18 -0.06 -0.16 -0.08 
Q2               -0.25 -0.08 -0.16 
Q3 -0.25               -0.32 -0.08 
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Table 9 
RPIX Summary Statistics 
 
RPI 
Date Actual Dif Fcast t=0 Dif Fcast t=7/8 Policy 
change 
Fcast 
change 
1994 Q3 2.00 -0.30 2.30     
Q4 2.50 0.40 2.10 -1.20 3.30 0.07 -1.27 
1995 Q1 2.80 -0.10 2.90 -0.60 3.50 0.13 -0.73 
Q2 2.80 0.10 2.70 -0.90 3.60 0.17 -1.07 
Q3 3.10 0.20 2.90 -0.30 3.20 0.04 -0.34 
Q4 3.00 -0.20 3.20 0.00 3.20 -0.08 0.08 
1996 Q1 2.90 0.10 2.80 -0.50 3.30 -0.16 -0.34 
Q2 2.80 0.10 2.70 -0.40 3.10 0.22 -0.62 
Q3 2.90 0.20 2.70 0.30 2.40 -0.11 0.41 
Q4 3.10 0.00 3.10 0.60 2.50 0.04 0.56 
1997 Q1 2.70 0.00 2.70 -0.30 3.00 0.08 -0.38 
Q2 2.70 0.10 2.60 -0.20 2.80 0.12 -0.32 
Q3 2.70 0.05 2.65 -0.15 2.80 0.16 -0.31 
Q4 2.70 0.10 2.60 -0.10 2.70 0.13 -0.23 
1998 Q1 2.60 0.00 2.60 0.20 2.40 0.00 0.20 
Q2 2.80 -0.03 2.83 0.33 2.50 -0.04 0.37 
Q3 2.50 -0.01 2.51 -0.29 2.80 -0.22 -0.07 
Q4 2.60 0.06 2.54 -0.16 2.70 -0.23 0.07 
1999 Q1 2.70 0.21 2.49 -0.41 2.90 -0.31 -0.10 
Q2 2.20 -0.28 2.48 -0.42 2.90 -0.31 -0.11 
Q3 2.10 -0.21 2.31 -0.19 2.50 -0.08 -0.11 
Q4 2.20 0.00 2.20 -0.22 2.42 0.08 -0.30 
2000 Q1 2.00 0.07 1.93 -0.71 2.64 0.23 -0.94 
Q2 2.20 0.32 1.88 -0.47 2.35 0.37 -0.84 
Q3 2.20 -0.18 2.38 -0.09 2.47 0.61 -0.70 
Q4 2.00 -0.36 2.36 -0.09 2.45 0.41 -0.50 
2001 Q1 1.90 -0.04 1.94 -0.61 2.56 -0.01 -0.60 
Q2 2.40 0.50 1.90 -0.53 2.43 -0.13 -0.40 
Q3 2.30 -0.01 2.31 -0.28 2.59 -0.28 0.00 
Q4 1.90 -0.10 2.00 -0.53 2.53 -0.15 -0.38 
2002 Q1 2.30 0.16 2.14 -0.44 2.58 0.05 -0.49 
Q2 1.50 -0.52 2.02 -0.54 2.56 0.12 -0.66 
Q3 2.10 0.26 1.84 -0.88 2.72 0.22 -1.10 
Q4 2.70 0.06 2.64 0.08 2.56 0.36 -0.28 
2003 Q1 3.00 0.23 2.77 0.22 2.55 0.40 -0.18 
Q2 2.80 -0.29 3.09 0.56 2.53 0.33 0.23 
Q3 2.80 -0.05 2.85 0.40 2.45 0.32 0.08 
 
 
 
